Out of the pink (house) and into the blue
Over the next six months, this column will frequently face a conflict of priorities between covering the upcoming elections around the country and the overall national situation. However, that is not the case today. Tomorrow, only a few municipalities in Mendoza will be going to the polls, but since the last column, there has been significant news—the death of a president. This event can be compared to the assassination of JFK, as depicted in William Manchester's book from almost six decades ago. Of course, the president's death here refers to his political downfall rather than his physical demise. In political terms, President Alberto Fernández's renunciation of his re-election bid on April 21 was more like a funeral than an end to his presidency.
In a country where urgent matters almost always overshadow the important ones, this premature transition to a "lame duck" status had immediate consequences. Opinions may differ on its impact on the already rising value of the "blue" dollar, which surged from 432 pesos before the president's exit from the electoral race and approached the 500-peso mark this week. However, it is evident that the situation did not help stabilize the economy. What is even more undeniable is that the "super-minister" Sergio Massa has effectively become the acting president, wielding more power than anyone since Juan Manuel de Rosas, the self-proclaimed "tyrant anointed by God."
Nevertheless, this column is more interested in exploring the deeper implications of the president's withdrawal from the race. It represents not only an individual crisis but also an institutional one. Throughout the 40 consecutive years of democracy, Argentina has always functioned as an ultra-presidential system, with the strength of the nation often dependent on the leader in power. However, Vice-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's creation of a puppet presidency has disrupted this institutional core over the past four years and possibly for good.
While elective government has traditionally been a choice between presidential and parliamentary democracy, the decline of the former in Argentina has not been accompanied by a rise in the latter. On the contrary, the legislative branch has become more dysfunctional than the executive branch, resulting in a gridlocked Congress. Although parliamentary democracy is not ready to fill the presidential vacuum, it still holds significant negative power, institutionally strengthened by the 1994 constitutional reform, despite failing to introduce parliamentary elements like a quasi-premier Cabinet chief.
Candidates like Javier Milei or Patricia Bullrich, who advocate for sweeping reforms and dismiss consensus, may resonate with the frustrated public mood. However, they should carefully consider the next Congress in their plans. Similarly, this column will shift its focus to the legislative campaign in the future, rather than solely concentrating on the presidential and gubernatorial races. Given the likely fragmentation of the Congress, these candidates might face a difficult choice between being stuck in gradualism due to parliamentary approval or bulldozing the Constitution.
Milei, at least, has started to acknowledge this problem and propose an alternative to the either/or proposition of presidential versus parliamentary democracy. He suggests plebiscitary or direct democracy as a way out of this dilemma. If the current government has drained ultra-presidential democracy of its substance, with nominal and real power canceling each other out, Argentina could potentially leapfrog into the digital age by using modern technology for direct plebiscitary democracy.